It Starts at the Margins: How Immigration Enforcement Is Paving the Way for the Surveillance State

Credit: Sheera Frenkel & Aaron Krolik, The New York Times

I. Abstract

Historically, immigration law has always been treated with a degree of exceptionalism. The plenary power doctrine has long dictated that the political branches of government have near-complete authority over matters pertaining to immigration and national security, and that the courts must exercise deference. As a result, a two-tiered system has arisen where those facing immigration investigations or proceedings are only granted a limited set of rights and protections, subject to the discretion of immigration enforcement agencies. This note argues that this two-tiered system has allowed immigration enforcement to act as a testing ground for repressive practices that will be eventually employed against the general public. It advances this argument in the context of the second Trump administration’s deportation efforts and modern developments in the surveillance technology sector, as it builds a close relationship with federal law enforcement. In doing so, it will examine how current practices employed by immigration enforcement agencies have begun to “spill over” to general law enforcement and threaten to erode the rights of the general public. Ultimately, it concludes that the only way to mitigate the impending risk of spillover and ensure the survival of Fourth Amendment rights is to dismantle the aforementioned two-tiered system through abandoning the judicial norm of deference in immigration and national security matters.

II. Introduction

In January 2026, it was reported by multiple outlets that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) bought access to social media and phone surveillance systems, Tangles and WebLoc, that contain billions of data points derived from ordinary mobile phone users across the country.¹ These systems enable ICE agents to monitor entire neighborhoods and track where and with whom people live, work, and socialize—all without a warrant, subpoena, or any real individualized cause for suspicion. It has been abundantly clear that under the direction of the Trump administration, immigration enforcement agencies have sought to further expand government contracts with data brokers as a means to enact its deportation agenda despite privacy concerns. Just months prior to the purchase of these systems, it was announced that ICE would be paying the software giant Palantir $30 million to build ImmigrationOS, a new platform that uses AI and data mining to identify, track, and deport suspected undocumented immigrants.² These policies are not a novel phenomenon, but rather glaring examples of a trend that has been building over the last decade. Time and time again, practices that would likely be prevented under normal Fourth Amendment scrutiny in criminal investigations have been permitted under the context of immigration enforcement.

Immigration law has always existed on the periphery with regard to the protection of civil rights. Since, in most contexts, an undocumented status only amounts to a civil violation, people undergoing deportation proceedings are not afforded many of the same constitutional rights and protections as criminal defendants. This is despite the fact that the consequences of such proceedings (i.e., detention and forced removal from their community and family) are much more akin to the consequences of a criminal conviction, rather than those of an adverse judgment in a civil case. Moreover, courts have historically treated the area of immigration enforcement in an exceptionalist manner. Immigration has often been deemed an inextricable issue from national security and sovereignty. As a result, courts have continuously been willing to cede their authority and defer to Congress and the Executive on almost any matter relating to immigration enforcement, tolerating blatant bypasses of the Constitution. This degree of exceptionalism has molded modern-day immigration law jurisprudence, creating an environment where the government is free to enact these aforementioned surveillance practices with little judicial pushback.

Not only is this a threat to the privacy and Fourth Amendment rights of people targeted by immigration enforcement agencies, but it is also a threat to the entire general public. Under the guise of national security, immigration enforcement has historically and increasingly been utilized as a testing ground for the government to normalize invasive surveillance practices and violations of Fourth Amendment rights. The government’s willingness to partner with data brokers and Big Tech signals a bleak future for the rights of citizens and noncitizens alike. The practices and programs created by immigration enforcement can be expected to be repurposed for general law enforcement use. History has shown how constitutional exceptionalism for immigration and/or national security purposes has the ability to spill over to the greater public through the institutional infrastructure, precedents, and norms it creates. As digital surveillance becomes more pervasive and politically palatable, the erosion of fundamental Fourth Amendment protections becomes all the more likely. The exceptionalism that has long been tolerated in immigration enforcement is ultimately incompatible with a future where the rights of all endure.

II. The Two-Tiered System

While every area of substantial regulation has its own distinct doctrinal landmarks, immigration law has historically existed in a special enclave where constitutional norms are no longer unassailable. A series of key moments in the doctrinal lineage of immigration law has provided the conditions to form this enclave and ensure its continued existence. Relics of the past, such as the plenary power doctrine and judicial deference, have allowed immigration enforcement to establish a parallel constitutional realm where basic protections and rights appear to be weakened into mere suggestions.

IIa. The Origins of Immigration Exceptionalism

The plenary power doctrine acts as the catalyst for exceptionalism within the realm of immigration law. It stipulates that the legislature and the executive have near-complete authority over matters relating to immigration, with minimal judicial oversight or interference.³ This doctrine is widely recognized to originate from the 1889 case Chae Chan Ping v. United States, otherwise known as the Chinese Exclusion Case. In this case, the Court upheld the Scott Act, which prevented the reentry of Chinese laborers into the country. The Court’s decision found the power to regulate the entry and exclusion of immigrants to exist within a greater interest to uphold national sovereignty, which in turn was already understood to be an area in which the political branches hold exclusive authority with minimal judicial review. Such reasoning was reaffirmed by the Court just four years later in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, in which the Court upheld the deportation of non-citizens without a trial. Thus, the plenary power doctrine at its core is understood to be an unenumerated power derived from the inherent authority possessed by the political branches. Yet, it remains the basis from which immigration policies are justified even in the modern day. As a result, immigration law has been largely insulated from any expansions of individual rights and protections experienced in the 20th century—especially with regard to privacy and due process rights. Courts at all levels have continuously reaffirmed that any regulations relating to immigration enforcement are inextricable from the sensitive questions of national security and sovereignty. This, in turn, has ensured that any rights and protections that have been recognized as entitled to noncitizens have been applied in a limited or deferential manner.

This norm of deference shapes the substantive scope of immigration authority; meanwhile, those subject to immigration enforcement are denied key procedural safeguards. Since removal proceedings are categorized as a civil process rather than criminal, courts have historically resisted providing the full set of procedural protections found within the criminal justice system for immigration cases, notably including the right to counsel. This has enabled government agencies to implement policies and practices that would face a much higher degree of constitutional scrutiny in other contexts. In tandem with the plenary power doctrine, this demonstrates how courts have been willing to turn a blind eye to constitutional shortcuts under the guise of preserving the authority of the political branches of government.

IIb. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984)

The consequences of this passivity are most evident concerning blatant violations of Fourth Amendment rights within immigration proceedings. The Supreme Court’s ruling in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza represents one of the most glaring examples of this. Respondents Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez were arrested by INS agents during workplace raids.⁴ In separate proceedings, both were issued deportation orders based on each respondent’s admission during their arrest that they entered the country illegally. Both respondents challenged the orders, arguing that their respective arrests were illegal and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sandoval-Sanchez further contested the use of his admission, claiming that it should be suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest under the exclusionary rule. In both cases, the Immigration Judge upheld the deportation order, holding that the legality of the arrest was irrelevant to the determination of deportation status because a deportation proceeding is a civil action.⁵ The cases were appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the orders, further adding that the exclusionary rule cannot be applied to deportation proceedings. Upon another appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling after finding that the respondents’ arrests were illegal, thus making their admissions fruit of unlawful arrests.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the INS and concluded that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply in deportation proceedings. Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion of the Court. The Court plainly states that the order must be upheld because the “body” or identity of a defendant is never suppressible in either civil or criminal proceedings. It further adds that deportation proceedings are civil actions, to which the protections afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable. Analyzing the case further, the Court bases its reasoning on the underlying purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter future unlawful police conduct. It argues that this purpose would not be served in the context of a deportation proceeding. This is because the INS must only prove identity and alienage to meet its burden in a deportation hearing. Given that the “body” or identity of a defendant is not suppressible, INS must only prove alienage, which oftentimes is fairly simple. The Court also points to the fact that INS has internal disciplinary measures to deter Fourth Amendment violations. As such, it reasons that the application of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings would only provide marginal benefit through additional deterrence. Moreover, the Court held that these benefits are far outweighed by the costs of potentially releasing a defendant who is unlawfully present on the basis of procedural errors, as their mere presence in the country puts them in continued violation of the law. In making this assessment, the Court asserted that deportation proceedings serve to determine whether an individual has a legal right to remain in the country, rather than necessarily punish wrongdoing. Given that such proceedings are not characterized as punitive sanctions, the Court reached the conclusion that the societal costs of excluding strong evidence outweighed the benefits of suppression.

This effectively made the exclusionary rule, a critical safeguard against illegal searches by law enforcement, a discretionary issue within the context of immigration. As a result, this has meant that evidence obtained through unconstitutional means is, in reality, rarely suppressed in deportation hearings because law enforcement can freely abuse this discretion.⁶ This problem is exacerbated by law enforcement officers within immigration enforcement agencies, who rarely face consequences for unlawful searches and seizures, and are thus given little incentive to operate within the bounds of the Constitution.

Given this arrangement, the doctrinal exceptionalism within immigration law has given rise to a two-tiered system of constitutional protections. Individuals facing criminal prosecution, at least in theory, are granted the full extent of constitutional protections against the state; individuals facing deportation must rely on a far more limited set of protections, such as in the case of the exclusionary rule.⁷ This has paved the way for law enforcement to utilize tactics for immigration enforcement that would never even be considered in other contexts. We have especially seen the culmination of this over the course of the second Trump administration, with ICE operating with little concern for the law. In January 2026, for example, a whistleblower report revealed a 2025 internal memo from the Acting Director of ICE that instructed officers that they were permitted to enter homes to conduct immigration arrests even in the absence of a judicial warrant.⁸ Despite the claims from ICE, such a policy is not supported by the existing case law, and as a result, some district courts have intervened and reaffirmed that home entry without a judicial warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, regardless of it being within the context of immigration enforcement. Illegal practices like this pose an even greater threat to both immigrants and the general public as immigration enforcement increasingly moves beyond the border to cities across the country, bringing in more and more people within the scope of a regime where constitutional rights can be so easily dismissed.

Ergo, the reach of Lopez-Mendoza goes beyond the mere procedural question regarding deportation proceedings; instead, it represents a clear entrenchment of a structural asymmetry in the recognition and protection of essential Fourth Amendment rights. The insulation of immigration enforcement agencies from any real constitutional scrutiny has created an environment in which expansive and illegal law enforcement practices can flourish, and we have seen exactly this happen at an exponential rate. This, of course, is the expected outcome given the proclivity of law enforcement to exploit such instances of deference and large corporate powers that have leveraged their resources to push for this. The scale of this issue continues to expand as governmental policy becomes increasingly dictated by the interests of the tech industry.

III. Big Tech and the Third-Party Doctrine

The heightened role of surveillance systems and data-tracking software in modern-day immigration enforcement did not come about organically. Rather, it exists as a result of the close relationship formed between the federal government and the nation’s powerful tech corporations.

As law enforcement agencies seek new, expansive tools, these corporations are incentivized to commodify vast sets of personal data and design software for the purpose of surveillance. By contracting with these software companies and data brokers, agencies such as ICE have been able to greatly expand their surveillance capabilities, far beyond any reasonable expectation. Given the novel nature of many of these technologies and practices, regulations and case law have failed to adequately control this rapid growth. As such, individuals seeking to invoke the law to protect their privacy in the modern day face an uphill battle against the tremendous forces of corporatocracy, equipped with only meager legislation and the scant vestiges of the consumer protection system.

For example, the Fourth Amendment is supposed to prevent the government from seizing individual cell phone and web browser data without a warrant. However, government agencies have been able to easily sidestep this by simply purchasing data from private actors.⁹ Over the last several years, the United States has seen a phenomenon where firms, small and large, have developed business models centered around commodifying public data and redefining state capacity, ultimately coupling regulation with the tech industry.¹⁰ Under its current language, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) grants the government far-reaching authority to conduct targeted surveillance against individuals believed to possess “foreign intelligence information” without the need for a warrant for national security purposes. According to revisions from 2015, Section 702 is not meant to allow for the collection of data on U.S. citizens in bulk. Yet, this is exactly what happens. The vagueness of the section’s language, lack of account for data purchasing, and absence of any real judicial oversight have paved the way for this to occur.¹¹ As a result, by utilizing the private sector and abusing its deference on matters pertaining to national security, the government can effectively obtain data it would normally be constitutionally barred from gathering. This is especially troubling given that the government can use information obtained under Section 702 in criminal cases and immigration proceedings, among other contexts. Thus, a simple distinction between compelled disclosure and purchased access can determine the constitutionality of a warrantless procurement of information, irrespective of the sensitivity of said information. Such a practice is rooted in the third-party doctrine, which holds that individuals lose their expectation of privacy—and thus their protection against warrantless searches—when they voluntarily disclose information to third parties. When applied in the context of the modern digital age, this doctrine enables the government to obtain immense quantities of data with little to no judicial oversight.

IIIa. Carpenter v. United States (2018)

Given these circumstances, the Supreme Court attempted to qualify the reach of the third-party doctrine in its ruling in Carpenter v. United States.

¹²

In 2011, authorities made arrests in connection with a series of armed robberies. One suspect confessed to the crimes and provided law enforcement with his cell phone number and those of the other participants. Without obtaining a warrant, the government used court orders under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), to obtain Timothy Carpenter’s historical cell-site location information (CSLI) from his wireless carriers. The CSLI revealed Carpenter’s movements over an extended period and was used to place him near the locations of the robberies. Based on this evidence, the government charged Carpenter with six counts of robbery and an additional six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence. He would be subsequently convicted and sentenced to more than 100 years in prison. Carpenter had moved to suppress the CSLI evidence that the government obtained without a warrant, claiming that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied the motion, allowing prosecutors to use the records at trial.¹³ The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had shared that information with his wireless carriers.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the government’s acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, thus requiring a warrant.¹⁴ Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court. The Court highlighted that the Fourth Amendment protects more than just property interests—it also protects one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Although the CSLI information in this case was held by a third-party service provider, the Court declined to extend the traditional third-party doctrine to CSLI. Instead, it noted that a key consideration when applying the third-party doctrine is “the nature of the particular documents sought.” Subsequently, the Court argued that the intrusiveness of CSLI records and the pervasive and largely unavoidable use of cell phones in the modern day weigh against the application of the third-party doctrine in this context. Moreover, the third-party doctrine only applies to the voluntary exposure of personal information. The Court reasoned that while a user may be abstractly aware of their provider keeping records, CSLI is automatically generated without any meaningful act of user consent, so these records are functionally not a form of voluntary exposure. Thus, the Court ultimately concluded that requiring a warrant in this context appropriately balances legitimate law enforcement interests with the need to protect privacy in the digital age.

While the Court’s decision in Carpenter represents a fairly logical restriction on the reach of the third-party doctrine, what is stopping federal law enforcement from simply ignoring this? As previously mentioned, the government has continuously been able to circumvent key rights and protections for individuals during investigations, so long as they ground it within immigration enforcement or greater national security interests. In these situations, courts across the country have turned a blind eye to practices that would ordinarily sound off constitutional alarm bells, allowing agencies free rein to continue operations—such as digital surveillance—with minimal constraint. In December 2025, we already saw a federal court sanction the use of Medicaid data, something previously considered untouchable, for immigration enforcement.¹⁵ Just three months later, the Trump administration was sued by a coalition of 22 states amid allegations that Medicaid data from citizens and lawful permanent residents was also shared with ICE, violating the December ruling.¹⁶ When standards, such as the ruling in Carpenter, are selectively enforced, they are unable to serve as a meaningful limitation on government surveillance in any context.

IV. The Risk of Spillover

Over time, a pattern has emerged as we have seen this dynamic be replicated with a wide array of essential privacy protections. These examples have highlighted that we cannot expect such blatant erosion of Fourth Amendment rights to remain isolated to issues of immigration enforcement and national security. Rather, as these unconstitutional practices by law enforcement become normalized in their use against vulnerable segments of the population, the line between exceptional and general policing is increasingly blurred. Thus, over time, we will see the same repressive practices used to oppress the immigrant community eventually employed against the greater public, regardless of citizenship or immigration status. This is not a new idea. In a way, this dynamic resembles the theory of the imperial boomerang, which holds that the practices developed by imperialist powers to subjugate colonies will eventually be deployed by those same nations domestically. When it comes to the history of American national security policy, there is a litany of examples where measures have purportedly been taken to protect the public but instead were vehicles for restricting freedoms. For many, the Patriot Act serves as a recent and obvious example of this. But we need not look to the past to recognize the risk of spillover from modern-day immigration enforcement. Since the beginning of the second Trump administration, there have been glaring examples of novel technology and practices developed for immigration enforcement being used to surveil the general public.

One such example lies with ICE’s usage of surveillance data from Flock Safety, a rapidly growing tech surveillance company based in Georgia. Law enforcement agencies and private businesses/organizations across the country have entered into contracts with Flock Safety, primarily for their AI video surveillance and automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) products.¹⁷ Flock Safety encourages its users to opt in to sharing data they collect with a massive, nationwide database for the use of law enforcement agencies. Due to the density of these networks and the overall aggregation of numerous data points over time, areas where Flock has an active presence effectively eroded any reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet, these networks have been defended due to their value to law enforcement, and in particular, immigration enforcement agencies. While many argue that the searches done through Flock necessitate a warrant, the database simply prompts agencies to enter text into a “reason” field. As such, ICE has been able to obtain Flock data without warrants through “side-door” searches done on its behalf by local and state law enforcement. This relationship has created instances where local law enforcement has allegedly provided ICE free access to surveillance data in violation of local laws prohibiting information-sharing with federal immigration enforcement.¹⁸ Nevertheless, both Flock and ICE continue to benefit from this arrangement in the absence of any substantial judicial oversight. This has had knock-on effects where law enforcement is emboldened to conduct warrantless and constitutionally dubious searches through Flock. Investigations into Flock data search logs have shown that agencies have been able to utilize these networks to collect data on individuals attending protests that are at odds with the Trump administration, namely pro-Palestine and “No Kings” protests.¹⁹ While it is obviously possible for crimes to occur at protests, the logs indicated that the listed reason for most of these searches was just “protest” rather than an actual criminal offence being investigated.

Needless to say, this is concerning not only because it represents a clear flouting of Fourth Amendment rights, but also because it demonstrates how easily broad surveillance power justified under the context of immigration enforcement can be repurposed to suppress the greater public. A society where liberties such as free speech and the right to protest are supposed to be inalienable is wholly incompatible with a state that is allowed to surveil any disfavored activity. The log labels of “protest” just really underscore how there are virtually no meaningful limitations on how advanced security systems like Flock are used. As a result, these technologies essentially serve as an all-encompassing surveillance tool that the public often never even consented to. This is the exact type of deeply intrusive and unwarranted privacy breach that Carpenter was meant to prohibit.

Another example of this type of spillover is illustrated by ICE’s use of Mobile Fortify, an app used by agents to identify individuals in real-time during field operations.²⁰ Mobile Fortify allows agents to use facial recognition software, biometric data, and other identifying information to quickly match with records within its Automated Targeting System (ATS) in order to determine an individual’s identity. According to a Privacy Threshold Analysis on Mobile Fortify written by the Department of Homeland Security, “ICE does not provide the opportunity for individuals to decline or consent to the collection and use of biometric data/photograph collection.”²¹ Moreover, any records collected on the app, regardless of whether you are a citizen or noncitizen, are logged as an encounter and retained in the database for 15 years. While the app as an investigative tool already sacrifices the Fourth Amendment rights of the immigrant community in order to streamline operations, it is clear that the capabilities of the app have not been limited to the context of immigration enforcement. During ICE’s operations in Minneapolis in early 2026, there were multiple notable reports of ICE agents using facial recognition software on citizens.²² Per DHS officials, this technology was expressly used to track citizens who had protested ICE’s presence in the city. Once again, this represents a concerning development where law enforcement is engaging in expansive and unwarranted on-the-spot identification practices, targeting individuals who are participating in constitutionally protected activities.

Overall, these exploitative practices surrounding emerging surveillance technologies are becoming increasingly normalized through their defended use in immigration enforcement. By allowing these agents to wield such powerful technology with no actual guardrails, the government threatens to fundamentally upend the practical force of the Fourth Amendment. If the need for judicial authorization or reasonable suspicion is allowed to function as mere suggestions, the core protections we champion for our privacy will no longer be able to constrain state power. Flock Safety and Mobile Fortify demonstrate that spillover is not a question of “if,” as it is already here. The remaining question is what the extent of the impact will be.

V. Safeguarding the Fourth Amendment

The issue of spillover is nothing new. For as long as the formal immigration system has existed in the United States, those within the immigrant population who could be othered have endured a limited set of rights and protections. Over time, repressive practices used by law enforcement against those within the margins of society have always found their way back around to being deployed against anyone in the public the government seeks to repress. What makes the current situation different is that now, in the modern day, where technological advancement is far outpacing the grasp of our regulatory institutions, spillover happens at a far quicker rate and has a much more visible impact. Furthermore, as the Trump administration continues to pursue its policy goals with no regard to the rule of law, the problem at hand is only exacerbated. When the government can no longer justify its conduct under a nebulous system of rules and power, the facade falls apart, and the reality of the situation is laid bare. The United States is rapidly turning into a surveillance state, and a sizable portion of the population does not care because the current victims are those proscribed as the “enemy.” Yet, everyone will feel the impact once the boomerang comes around.

We find ourselves at a time where government policy is becoming more and more entwined with the interests of tech corporations and vice versa. The government has partnered with the private sector to harness the leading technologies of the day not to improve the lives of the average American, but to expedite the monitoring, persecution, and deportation of the immigrant community. All the while, the government flippantly sidesteps the weak regulations we have in place by creating a market for shady data brokers and buying incalculable quantities of individual user data.²³ Then, once again, the government turns to the private sector to demand more tools to monitor citizens, challenging the current administration under the pretext of immigration enforcement and national security, and the private sector happily obliges. It truly seems like insurmountable forces are at play, but it is precisely this notion of inevitability that must be rejected. The current circumstances are solely a product of the government and private sector being allowed to act with impunity.

Thus, the only way to mitigate the issue of spillover is by addressing the underlying issue—we cannot allow our two-tiered system to continue. The norm of deference exercised by the courts has allowed immigration enforcement agencies to remain insulated from any meaningful constitutional scrutiny. Continuing this norm would only serve to maintain immigration enforcement as a testing ground for suppressive practices and policies that will eventually be inflicted on everyone. The idea of plenary powers is clearly not compatible with a healthy and free democracy. The conduct of ICE in the past year alone has thoroughly demonstrated how foundational protections can be so easily circumvented through private channels when there is no actual oversight or authority to answer to. In the absence of any immediate judicial intervention, the boundary between ordinary enforcement of the law and exceptional circumstances will continue to blur, and the Fourth Amendment rights we cherish will exist in name only. Thus, it is self-evident that exceptionalism within immigration law must come to an end. Immigration enforcement agencies need to be subject to the same constitutional bounds as traditional law enforcement and those within immigration proceedings, regardless of status, should be afforded the same protections as anyone else facing the potential loss of liberty. As recent history has demonstrated, we must start our defense of Fourth Amendment protections at the margins of society before the practices we turn a blind eye to become the reality for all.

Edited by Annelise Dramm and Tiffany Valkova

About the Author

Andreas Kapoglis is a senior at Northeastern University majoring in Political Science and Economics with a minor in Data Science. He has served as a Digital Writer for the Northeastern University Undergraduate Law Review since Fall 2025. Last semester, he wrote a note titled A Wall in Ruins: What Drummond Reveals About the Future of the Establishment Clause and Public Education, arguing that religious charter schools are incompatible with the separation of church and state in light of the Supreme Court’s split decision in Oklahoma Charter School Board v. Drummond.

Andreas’s legal interests include immigration law, labor rights, and civil liberties. He previously served as a paralegal co-op at O’Malley, Harvey and Brosnan, LLC and a legal support co-op in the Major Crimes Unit of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts. Additionally, he is the former president of the Systemic Justice Project (now Critical Corporate Theory Lab) on campus.

In his free time, Andreas enjoys playing pick-up soccer with friends, cooking/baking, and learning new languages.

It Starts at the Margins: How Immigration Enforcement Is Paving the Way for the Surveillance State

I. Abstract

II. Introduction

II. The Two-Tiered System

IIa. The Origins of Immigration Exceptionalism

IIb. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984)

III. Big Tech and the Third-Party Doctrine

IIIa. Carpenter v. United States (2018)

IV. The Risk of Spillover

V. Safeguarding the Fourth Amendment

About the Author

Notes from the Author

It Starts at the Margins: How Immigration Enforcement Is Paving the Way for the Surveillance State

A Wall in Ruins: What Drummond Reveals About the Future of the Establishment Clause and Public Education

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