Justice v. Ethics: Navigating the Boundaries

Abstract

Morality and the law have long been believed to exist as mirror images. Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin offers the view that they are reflective; the law tells us something about human morality, and morality is exhibited in practice by the law. However, there exists a logical fallacy in this claim. Logically, Dworkin’s concept of law creation is faulty in that it “affirms the consequent”. Dworkin’s concept is exhibited through the framework that:

If all A->B then all B->A.

Logically we understand that if all a’s are b’s for example: all cats are mammals, we cannot in turn assume all b’s are a’s, or all mammals are cats.

Dworkin argument is as follows:

If law should be understood as a system of principles rather than a collection of rules, then legal decisions must be guided by morality
Legal decisions are guided by moral principles.
Therefore, legality reflects moral truths.

While this mode of thinking is logically false, in the case of Riggs v. Palmer (1889), this paper seeks to examine the significance of the verdict: those who commit crimes may not benefit from said crimes. The jurisprudence of this case exposes how moral considerations infect the creation and adaptation of modern-day law.

In this paper, the Dworkianian view will be contested by a countervailing ideology: legal positivism. Legal positivism, coined by H.L.A Hart, explains that laws are social constructions and not based on morality. Hart believes that laws come from tradition, legislation, and judicial decision-making. This paper will unearth how Dworkin’s view of the law and legal positivism exist within the case of Riggs v. Palmer, and the ways in which legal positivism earns more respect as a theory. This paper will also explain the dangers of adopting Dworkin’s view in the modern day. To conclude, it will be argued that legal positivism is a better-suited framework for application to Riggs v. Palmer than Dworkin’s view.

I. Introduction

Ronald Dworkin is a prominent legal philosopher known for his contributions to the understanding of law, rights, and morality. His work often intersects with themes relevant to natural law theory. Natural law is a philosophical belief that people have intrinsic knowledge of governance through the use of reason. There is a particular emphasis on principles over rules and the moral underpinnings of legal interpretation.¹ It is the belief that all people know how to behave ethically and these behaviors should be captured by law. Dworkin argued against legal positivism, which is the view that law is what is posited by authority and is obeyed habitually.² Dworkin advocates for a “moral reading” of the law. He believed that legal decisions should not only be based on established rules but also on moral principles that reflect society’s values. In his influential works, such as Law’s Empire, he posits that law is inherently connected to ethics and that judges must interpret laws in light of these moral principles to ensure justice.

This paper finds Dworkin’s argument is synonymous to a logical fallacy. Affirming the consequent occurs in conditional reasoning and the structure typically looks like this⁴:

If A, then B.
B is true.
Therefore, A is true.

This reasoning is faulty because B being true does not necessarily mean that A must also be true. There could be other reasons for B being true. An example is presented below:

If Mimo is a cat, then Mimo is a mammal.
Mimo is a mammal.
Therefore, Mimo is a cat.

In this example, the conclusion is invalid because Mimo could be a dog, goat, or a horse. It is not necessary that because cats are mammals all mammals have to be a cat. Dworkin uses this logic in his argument outlined below:

If law should be understood as a system of principles then legal decisions must be guided by moral principles, which provide a foundation for rights and duties.
Legal decisions are guided by moral principles.
Therefore legality reflects moral truths.

It is evident then, in this instance, to see that although morality may be a portion of the law, it need not be the driving force of law creation. The case of Riggs v. Palmer will be used to discuss how Dworkin’s view and legal positivism operate in practice.

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II. Riggs v. Palmer and Jurisprudence

To analyze the framework for Dworkin’s beliefs, the case of Riggs v. Palmer can be examined to explain the extent to which morality can be the basis for legality. The plaintiffs of the case are Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Palmer, the daughters of the deceased Francis B. Palmer, and the defendant Elmer Palmer, the grandson of Francis B. Palmer. In the late 1800s, Francis B. Palmer expressed to his immediate family in his final will and testament to leave his estate to Elmer, while making his daughters small beneficiaries. However, Elmer, unhappy with his grandfather and anticipating an inheritance, poisoned his grandfather. Elmer murdered his grandfather, believing this act would ensure he would inherit the estate before any changes could be made to the will. After the murder, Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Palmer disputed the conditions of the will and submitted Elmer E. Palmer to probate court. The arguments presented by the defense state that the testator is dead, his will was made in due form and has been admitted to probate, and therefore it must have effect according to the letter of the law.⁶ This argument reflects that despite Palmer’s conviction, he was made beneficiary to the estate in a legal manner prior to the death of Francis B. Palmer. The will was acknowledged by the courts and was signed accordingly. Palmer was well within the statutes to inherit the estate and if the law were literally obliged, he must have been the recipient despite his arrest.

IIa. Plaintiffs’ Arguments and Ruling

The plaintiffs argue that the defendant should not inherit the estate because it would be unjust for him to financially benefit from committing a murder. In the late nineteenth century, there were no rational interpretations of the law that provided any adequate basis for Palmer not to inherit the will. Given the non-discretionary characteristics of the law, the courts decided that those who issued the probate process, in which an authorized executor distributes the deceased assets as instructed in the will, would not have agreed to distribute such assets when the retaining party was to blame for the issuer of assets death. Due to the law’s nuance, the executors of the estate contested the validity of the will based on the principle that no one should benefit from their own wrongdoing. The case made its way through the courts, and in 1889, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that Elmer E. Palmer could not inherit from his grandfather due to his involvement in his murder. This decision established the legal principle known as “slayer statutes,” which prevent individuals from profiting as a result of their own criminal actions.⁷ This principle aims to prevent a murderer from benefitting from a crime that they committed. The moral element comes into play in two parts: first, murder is wrong because it harms someone to the highest degree, and second, the community does not accept when someone is not punished for their crimes.

IIb. Takeaways

The establishment of the legal precedent that individuals who commit wrongdoings cannot profit from their crimes upholds the moral principle that wrongdoing should not be rewarded. Allowing a murderer to inherit an estate solely because of a murder they committed would be rewarding criminal behavior. One must think about how this precedent would affect public perception and citizens’ understanding of the law if it was acceptable to benefit from crimes committed. This principle reinforces the idea that society should not tolerate actions that undermine the legal and moral framework. In respect to Dworkin, if we believe the laws are an extension of our moral beliefs, then we must discourage criminal behavior by removing any potential gain from such actions. By ensuring that wrongdoers cannot benefit from their actions financially, the law deters those individuals from committing said crimes. This is a principle of Dworkin’s view when he refers to the “law as integrity.”⁸

For Dworkin, the interpretation of law involves finding the most morally justifiable reading of existing material. The principles which underpin the law are not merely authoritative, they are normative, meaning that they have an intrinsic moral weight and function.

For Dworkin, in the case of Riggs v. Palmer, the ruling exists this way to help maintain the integrity of the legal and inheritance systems. The law ensures that the distribution of an estate reflects the true wishes of the deceased. The courts did not merely rely on a literal interpretation of the laws but found the broader conclusion that murderers should not profit from their crimes.

III. The Fallacy

Dworkin falls short in his theory when he assumes that a “right answer” is always needed. In order for mutual exclusivity to exist in regard to legal decisions and moral principles, Dworkin is supposing that the law is idealistic as it is now and in its evolution. David Dyzenhaus; a prominent legal scholar, has criticized Dworkin’s notion of “integrity” as unrealistic, particularly in highly complex and heterogeneous societies.⁹ Dyzenhaus argues that judges may face situations where moral principles themselves conflict, and there may be no clear way to reconcile these conflicts. In Dworkin’s theory, he is notoriously known for giving too much power to the judicial system. The rule of the law is undermined when legal professionals are given more power than the text; if judges can interpret the law based on moral principles then this leads to potential concerns regarding unpredictability, uncertainty, and confusion. By opening this door Dworkin opens up a world ridden by “judicial activism:” where judges impose their own ethical preferences onto the law.

To further this point, democratic legitimacy is being contested by valuing the preferences of individuals rather than decision-making by the collective through the democratic process. If a legal theory must reflect how society operates then Dworkin again fails to meet the mark. Dworkin’s theory is also idyllic in nature. He assumes that legal systems ridden by morality and principles of fairness guide uniform interpretations even in areas of ambiguity. Dworkin’s theory lacks the nuance of varied legal opinions. There is a blatant disconnect regarding the practical realities of the legal system of the United States, especially due to the pluralism of society.

This critique shatters the concept of exclusivity and perpetuates the criticisms that Dworkin’s view of legalism does not exist in nature. A->B does not equate to B->A.

IV. What are the Implications of Dworkin’s Ideology Today

To examine further the implications of Dworkin’s theory it would be valuable to explore modern examples. As stated previously Dworkin’s theory is not applicable for a myriad of reasons. Given Dworkin’s theory the belief that there must be a “right” answer is required, judges and legislators would be able to morally permeate their morals into the law, and finally the theory undermines democratic legitimacy. If we examine this through modern-day lenses then Americans become aware of how this failing system has readily become the reality. In this portion of the paper, discussing the 45th and now 47th president of the United States Donald J. Trump’s campaign and support of Project 2025 will be analyzed.

Project 2025 describes the political initiative that’s goal is to reshape U.S. government policies by the year 2025. The plan orchestrates over 100 organizations from across the conservative movement, to take down the deep state, and return the government back to its people.¹⁰ The deep state refers to an alleged shadowy group of powerful bureaucrats and officials who, according to many, wield undue influence over government policies, regardless of the elected administration.¹¹ The organization seeks to oppose: abortion and reproductive rights, LGBTQ rights, immigrants’ rights, and racial equity, in their largest publication “Mandate for Leadership” the 900-page manual describes the plans how? And why? Although President Trump has distanced himself from the plan, Project 2025 alludes to making sure the right candidate wins the 2024 election and has referenced itself as an institutionalization of Trumpism.

IVa. Dworkin’s Thoughts

Dworkin would say that if these laws are cast into practice then they must embody fairness and justice, however, Dworkin did not picture that representation would be so uniformly colored Red. For Dworkin, he shares that the Constitution should be examined as a living document not fixed and that it is an instrument that will evolve alongside the moral principles of justice that underlie it.¹² To explain, if a law constricts a fundamental right such as freedom or equality then judges should interpret the constitution in a way that brings the law into balance with those rights, even if created by democratic means. This would mean scrutinizing proposals made by Trump in the following year that mirror the demand of Project 2025. However, Dworkin’s view does not rectify how that will occur with judges in the Supreme Court that share Trump’s ideology. To an all-red Supreme Court, Project 2025, may be ethically consistent. The judges believe they are acting in ways that do not devalue people’s freedoms but rather support them to the furthest extent.

In June of 2022, Roe v. Wade was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court and abandoned its duty to protect fundamental rights to privacy, liberty, and dignity. Dworkin would argue that in his analysis of these hard cases, balancing competing principles would be important to weigh.¹³ What Dworkin argues for is for a reading of documents like the Constitution to come from a moral ground, yet what moral code should be the one judges reference? Despite Dworkin’s attempt to begin to account for the creation of unjust laws it still references idyllic solutions. What this analysis further reinforces is that a Dworkinian view of the law is insufficient.

V. Legal Positivism

In the case of Riggs v. Palmer, it is acknowledged that there may be an important role that morality plays in the creation and adaptation of laws. However, morality should not be the primary concern. When interpreting Dworkin’s principles to a modern-day understanding of law it reigns problematic. In examining another school of thought: legal positivism, proves to be a more consistent interpretation as to what the laws are. Legal positivism is a school of thought in legal theory that presumes that the rationality of a law is not connected to its moral value. The legal positivist holds that only positive law is law; and by “positive law” they mean legal interpretation should focus on the rules and structures established by the legal system, rather than on moral considerations.¹⁴ Nothing else is “law” to him, even though he may recognize other normative orders such as the religious or moral orders, or etiquette.¹⁵ In essence, legal positivism holds that “what the law is” can be separated from “what the law ought to be.”¹⁶

From a historical standpoint; John Austin, an English jurist and philosopher, is considered to be the founder of legal positivism. Austin’s work laid the foundation for much of modern legal theory, and is best known for his contribution “The Command of the Sovereign”.¹⁷ Essentially, the text discusses the ways in which the law is commanded by a sovereign authority. The power derived from the law is enforced through the threat of punishment for noncompliance. Sovereign defined by Austin is the ultimate power within a legal system. Austin’s definition of law speaks to the idea that laws are rules and commands issued by the sovereign.¹⁸ A command, therefore, is a directive issued by an enforcer to a subordinate, describing the particular course of desired action. Sanctions are the threat of punishment accompanied by disregarding the sovereign’s command. In Austin’s perspective, the threat of punishment discourages those from breaking the law. To share a brief example within U.S legislation; the U.S., being the sovereign, issues a command that states “do not steal,” and the threat of imprisonment is the sanction used to deter those from the action of stealing.

The legal obligation is then to act in accordance with the sovereigns command or else they will be met with the threat of sanction. This is not a stance based on moral or ethical considerations, but rather a part of the social contract individuals agree upon living/working within a sovereign. This mode of thought is a stance taken notably by legal philosopher H.L.A Hart, whose work is authored in the twentieth century, and proposes that a society’s legal system is defined by the “rule of recognition”. In this portion of the paper, it will be argued that legal positivism is the driving force for legal creation and that the jurisprudence surrounding Riggs v. Palmer suits this theory more adequately.

Va. Rule of Recognition

The rule of recognition serves as a stamp of approval; which determines what counts as law in any given society. The aspects of recognition include: authority. To define how these coincide with one another we must examine the roles they play separately. Authority establishes the source of law being addressed and makes it authoritative and binding to the members of society.¹⁹ In this case, we see that the daughters of Francis Palmer had a reliance on their court system to bring about acknowledgment for the case of their father’s estate. This is prevalent within the U.S. legal system. It is fulfilled by the roles of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. These branches are recognized authorities that enforce faith within the people of America. If not for these branches then vigilante justice would be more prevalent. What Dworkin doesn’t acknowledge that legal positivism does is how the establishment reigns as the supreme authority. It is not through moral enlightenment that the courts appoint who they appoint to sit on benches, but a belief in the system that appoints people to benches. The authority has the right to distinguish themselves from morality.

In a case like Riggs v. Palmer, however, we see that the literal interpretation of the law was not followed and morality did make an appearance. Despite this truth, legal positivism was a part of the verdict in the case. A literal interpretation of the rules prior to the verdict dictated murder was wrong and theft was wrong, both punishable offenses that in some instances result in arrest.²⁰ Those convicted of murder such as Elmer E. Palmer, who was a convicted felon prior to his appearance in probate court, cannot benefit on grounds that the rights of a convicted felon are already infringed by prison time and thus cannot benefit from an inheritance that landed them in jail to begin with. Moral consideration, while Dworkinians may argue for, does not need to be the method in which the courts in (1889) reached their decision. Legal positivists argue that law and morality are distinct; laws can be valid and practiced in a society even if they are unjust. This theory focuses on describing how laws function in practice, rather than assumptions regarding how laws ought to be. It seeks to provide a clear framework for understanding the law as a man-made construct that is distinct from ethical considerations.

VI. Conclusion

Dworkinian legal theory shares that morality is the driving force in which laws are shaped. Dworkin works alongside interpretations of natural law and believes in the integrity of the legal system. In the case of Riggs v. Palmer, we see how Dworkin makes the argument for a moral acknowledgment in law creation. Those appointed to fulfill the roles of authority were given that role based on their credibility in being moral interpreters of the law and upholding its value. The logical fallacy I sought to point out in this argument is how morality and legalism cannot exist as mutually exclusive terms. When observed in the context of today’s legal system, a reading of Dworkin does not help explain why unjust laws can exist.

If it is granted that laws come about through morality then there must be universal moral truths. Since we cannot identify any that exist across all communities, one must concede that the dynamic nature of the law cannot be prescribed to morality. Morality is not dynamic, yet the laws are. The laws are descriptive of changes in social values, political shifts, or significant judicial rulings. These aspects of the law have altered what is accepted as law throughout the years. These issues have changed public attitudes towards marriage, race, and reproductive rights. Social acceptance does not require moral endorsement; law can be valid even if groups within a community believe it is unjust.

Legal Positivism highlights this separation and adjusts itself onto mechanisms of the law rather than ethical implications. This also proves how the effectiveness of a legal system depends on the legitimacy perceived by the community. If people believe a law is unjust they will be less complacent and undermine the authority of the legal system. The proposition A->B does not equate to B->A. H.L.A Hart reiterates how acceptance of the law can exist without social endorsement and an authority that can be appointed that inherently holds power but does not exist as moral proponents of truth.

Legal positivism as a school of thought is more suitable as a theory when imagined under the scope of Riggs v. Palmer. The theory states that laws are creations of human authority and emphasize the separation between law and morality. The validity of the law comes from its source and how it is enacted, not by its moral or ethical considerations. This framework suits the case of Riggs v. Palmer because it showcases how evolving legal traditions exist in relation with one another. The verdict that criminals cannot profit from their crimes was a question raised by how laws interact in practice. In this paper, it was argued that legal positivism was a more encompassing approach and the fallacy presented by Dworkin was justified.

Justice v. Ethics: Navigating the Boundaries

Abstract

I. Introduction

II. Riggs v. Palmer and Jurisprudence

IIa. Plaintiffs’ Arguments and Ruling

IIb. Takeaways

III. The Fallacy

IV. What are the Implications of Dworkin’s Ideology Today

IVa. Dworkin’s Thoughts

V. Legal Positivism

Va. Rule of Recognition

VI. Conclusion

About the Author

Notes from the Author

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